미국의+대북한+인식.관료정치.그리고+동맹이+북핵위기에+미친영향
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작성일 22-12-23 13:58
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Download : 미국의+대북한+인식.관료정치.그리고+동맹이+북핵위기에+미친영향.pdf
부시 政府는 그동안 개최되었던 3자 회담과 1차?2차 6자 회담을 통해 북한에게 주도권을 양보할 의사가 없다는 것을 명백히 하고, 북한이 핵문제를 통해 경제적인 지원을 얻고자 하는 태도를 바꾸지 않는다면 군사제재도 고려할 수 있다는 입장을 확고히 하였다. 따라서 부시 政府는 확고하고 지속적인 강경책이 북한을 변화시키는데 보다 效果적이라고 판단하였다.설명
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Download : 미국의+대북한+인식.관료정치.그리고+동맹이+북핵위기에+미친영향.pdf( 20 )
미국외교정책,관료정치,동맹,1차,북핵위기,2차,북핵위기,논문,졸업,경영학,경영경제,레포트
레포트/경영경제
미국의+대북한+인식.관료정치.그리고+동맹이+북핵위기에+미친영향
[졸업] 미국의 대북한 인식관료정치그리고 동맹이 북핵위기에 미친영향: 1993년 1차 북핵위기와 2002년 2차 북핵위기를 중심으로에 대한 입니다
[졸업] 미국의 대북한 인식관료정치그리고 동맹이 북핵위기에 미친영향: 1993년 1차 북핵위기와 2002년 2차 북핵위기를 중심으로에 대한 자료입니다 , 미국의+대북한+인식.관료정치.그리고+동맹이+북핵위기에+미친영향경영경제레포트 , 미국외교정책 관료정치 동맹 1차 북핵위기 2차 북핵위기 논문 졸업 경영학
차 례
그림목차 ··································································································································· 3
표 차 례 ··································································································································· 3
국 문 요 약 ····························································································································· 4
제1장 서 론 ··························································································································· 1
1.1 문제제기 ························································································································ 1
1.2 연구방법 ························································································································ 4
제2장 理論(이론)적 논의와 analysis(분석) 틀 ····························································································· 7
2.1 미국외교정책결定義(정이) 일반적 구조 ············································································ 7
2.1.1 인식과 외교정책 ··································································································· 7
2.1.2 국내정치와 외교정책 ························································································· 10
2.1.3 국외정치와 외교정책 ························································································· 13
2.2 국제관계에서 북핵의 의미 ······················································································ 16
2.3 理論(이론)적 배경과 analysis(분석) 틀 ···························································································· 26
제3장 1차 북핵위기와 클린턴 政府의 외교정책 ··························································· 37
3.1 개 관 ·························································································································· 37
3.2 클린턴 政府의 1차 북핵위기에 대한 외교정책결정요인 ·································· 43
3.2.1 클린턴 政府의 북한에 대한 인식 ··································································· 43
3.2.2 클린턴 政府의 관료정치 ··················································································· 47
3.2.3 1차 북핵위기와 한국?日本 ?China?러시아 ················································· 53
3.3 1차 북핵위기와 클린턴 政府의 외교정책의 일관성 ·········································· 59
3.3.1 북한과의 강한 협상의지 ··················································································· 59
3.3.2 협상의 타결 ········································································································· 64
3.3.3 일관성 있는 외교정책 ······················································································· 70
3.4 평 가 ·························································································································· 80
제4장 2차 북핵위기와 부시 政府의 외교정책 ······························································· 84
4.1 개 관 ·························································································································· 84
4.2 부시政府의 2차 북핵위기에 대한 외교정책결정요인 ········································ 93
4.2.1 부시政府의 북한에 대한 인식 ········································································· 93
4.2.2 부시政府의 관료정치 ························································································· 95
4.2.3 2차 북핵위기와 한국?日本 ?China?러시아 ··············································· 103
4.3 2차 북핵위기와 부시 政府의 외교정책의 비일관성 ········································ 110
4.3.1. 북한과의 약한 협상의지 ················································································· 110
4.3.2. 협상의 지연 ······································································································· 115
4.3.3. 일관성 없는 외교정책 ····················································································· 119
4.4 평 가 ························································································································ 130
제5장 결 론 ······················································································································· 134
참고한 문헌 ······························································································································· 139
부 록 ······························································································································· 155
ABSTRACT ························································································································ 174
클린턴 政府의 유화적인 대응방식으로 인해 북한에게 핵문제에 대한 주도권을 뺏기고, 핵개발의 빌미를 제공했다고 보았다.
1차 북핵위기시 북한의 보상외교와는 달리 부시 政府는 2차 북핵위기를 통해 미국이 대화의 주도권을 잡고 북한에게 역보상외교를 요구하고 있다 하지만 부시 政府의 북한에 대한 무리한 요구는 오히려 회담의 협상력을 떨어뜨리는 결과를 초래하고 있다 부시 政府가 2차 북핵위기에서 대북한 외교의 목표(goal)는 1차 북핵위기처럼 현상유지가 아니라 이번 위기를 계기로 핵개발이 근절되기를 바라고 있는것이다. 그럼에도 불구하고 제네바협정을 어겼…(skip)
다.
